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Abstract—Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been
applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to perfor-
mance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse grained.
In this work, we demonstrate a precise hardware-assisted kernel
CFI running on widely-used off-the-shelf processors. Specifically,
we use the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication (PAuth) extension
and present a design that uses it to achieve strong security
guarantees with minimal performance penalties. Furthermore, we
show how deployment of such security primitives in the kernel
can significantly differ from their user space application.
1. Introduction
The Linux kernel open source community has recently directed
much effort on improving the security and attack resistance of the
kernel. This is evident from both a good track record in fixing
reported vulnerabilities, but also in the number of new security
features introduced in the kernel. These include security solutions
adapted from user space mechanisms such as address space layout
randomization (ASLR) [1], W ⊕X memory policies or coarse-
grained CFI integration [2], [3]. Performance costs prevent the use
of powerful security solutions such as fine-grained CFI. Nonethe-
less, the currently integrated mechanisms preclude many crude
memory attacks, such as code injection, inside the kernel.
Still, more than 50% of the recently reported CVEs on kernel
vulnerabilities relate to memory errors [4]. Moreover, new ad-
vanced attacks, such as, control-flow bending [5] or data-oriented
programming (DOP) [6], are likely to eventually be used as part of
kernel exploit chains. At the same time, new hardware memory-
safety features are introduced into ARM and Intel processors. To
date, most of the design evolution in this domain has targeted the
protection of user applications, under the assumption that transfer-
ring the hardware mechanisms into kernel space is straightforward.
In this paper, we argue that this is only partially true, and use the
recent ARMv8.3-PAuth extension as an example of this.
We apply PAuth to the Linux kernel to prevent the exploitation
of bugs that could, for instance, lead to root privilege escalation
or leakage of system secrets. This requires non-trivial changes and
additions to prior PAuth-based schemes. Because of programming
patterns used withing the kernel, approaches that focus only on
function pointers are ineffective in kernel context. Our design ac-
commodates and protects such patterns by also protecting pointers
to critical data structures, such as the use of operations tables that
contain function pointers. The PAuth keys are not banked, i.e., they
must be switched out when entering or exiting kernel space. We
1 func: // Prologue
2 stp fp, lr, [sp, #-16]!
3 mov fp, sp
4 // ...
5 // Epilogue
6 ldp fp, lr, [sp], #16
7 ret
Listing 1. The AArch64 frame record is used to store and restore the FP
and LR values in the function prologue and epilogue, respectively.
demonstrate a novel design that uses execute-only memory (XOM)
to securely set kernel keys without exposing them to an adversary
that can read kernel memory. The contributions of this paper are:
1) A secure architecture for kernel PAuth key management, that
does not depend on traps to higher exception levels (ELs).
2) A design for maintaining binary compatibility between non-
PAuth processors and a protected kernel and modules.
3) A PAuth instrumentation scheme that is compatible and ef-
fective with Linux kernel coding patterns.
4) A hardened PAuth backwards CFI scheme that is robust
against replay attacks despite kernel task stack shallowness.
2. Background
2.1. Code reuse attacks on AArch64
The AArch64 call instructions save the function return address
in the link register (LR). The canonical prologue for a non-leaf
function then stores it and the caller’s frame pointer (FP) 1 on the
stack (Listing 1). The epilogue conversely restores the FP and LR
values from the stack. In this scenario, a memory vulnerability—
e.g., stack-buffer overflows—may enable an attacker to overwrite
the frame record and control LR when the RET is invoked [7]. The
attacker can then redirect the execution flow to an arbitrary address,
e.g., for return-oriented programming (ROP) [8]. Similarly, jump-
oriented programming (JOP) [9] attacks corrupt instructions point-
ers in memory before they are consumed by an indirect jump BR
or call BLR instruction. Alternatively, attacks may target function
pointers indirectly referenced in data structures, such as C++ virtual
table pointers [10].
1. unless disabled by compiler optimizations
1 func: // Prologue
2 pacia lr, sp
3 stp fp, lr, [sp, #-16]!
4 mov fp, sp
5 // ...
6 // Epilogue
7 ldp fp, lr, [sp], #16
8 autia lr, sp
9 ret
Listing 2. The SP is signed and authenticated in the function prologue and
epilogue, respectively.
2.2. AArch64 pointer authentication (PAuth)
ARMv8.3-A introduces the PAuth extension (see also Sec-
tion B). It substitutes unused bits in AArch64 pointers to store
a keyed message authentication code (MAC). We follow ARM
notation, and call the MAC a pointer authentication code (PAC).
The PAC is, by default, generated using the QARMA [11] al-
gorithm. It is derived from a secret key, the pointer’s address
and a modifier. On load, a pointer can be authenticated against
the same secret key and modifier. PAuth can be used to build
statistical CFI and data flow integrity (DFI). Starting from version
5.0, the Linux kernel enables the use of PAuth in user space and for
kernel virtual machines (KVM) guests but not kernel space. The
LLVM/Clang and GCC compilers support backward-edge CFI with
PAuth but use only the stack pointer (SP) as modifier(Listing 2).
If the LR value saved on the stack was overwritten during between
the prologue and the epilogue, then the AUTIA instruction should
detect a mismatch in the PAC, and set LR to an invalid address,
such that RET triggers an instruction fault exception, rather than
execute the attacker’s ROP chain.
The kernel tracks keys in the per-thread thread_struct
in-kernel structure, and installs the keys of the switched-to thread
during user context switch. The exec() system call will auto-
matically generate a new set of keys whenever a new user address
space is instantiated. By default, keys are shared by all tasks in a
single address space, but an architecture-specific prctl() call is
available to manually provision keys per thread.
2.3. Kernel-user separation
The Linux kernel implements a 1:1 threading model, i.e., one
kernel task is allocated for each user thread in user mode (EL0).
When a user thread invokes a system call, execution flow is trans-
ferred to the kernel exception handler in kernel mode (EL1). SP
is banked on AArch64, i.e., the processor keeps track of the value
separately for each EL, However the general-purpose registers
(GPRs) and the system registers holding the current PAuth keys
are shared between all ELs. Consequently, the exception handler
must save the processor state before executing the system call in
EL1, and afterwards restore it before returning to EL0. The same
sequence also occurs when user space triggers an exception, or
when an asynchronous interrupt is encountered when a user thread
is running. Because the PAuth keys are not banked, they must
be set on kernel entry if PAuth is to be used within the kernel.
Conversely, the PAuth keys of the running user process must be
restored when the kernel returns to EL0.
3. Threat model and requirements
3.1. Threat model
We assume a powerful adversary with full control over unpriv-
ileged user processes, including the capability to launch arbitrary
processes and invoke arbitrary system calls. We further assume
that the adversary can use a memory corruption bug in the kernel
system call interface to read and write kernel memory. However,
the adversary cannot modify write-protected memory (including
XOM). This limitation can be realized by locking down memory
management unit (MMU) system control registers and tables via
the hypervisor [12]. Nonetheless, the adversary can leak kernel
secrets in readable memory and overwrite pointers in writable
memory regions.
3.2. Requirements
Our goal is to protect kernel call-flow by protecting the integrity
of vulnerable pointers. Specifically, we use PAuth to fulfill the
following requirements:
• Integrity: Detect corruption of pointers that affect kernel
control flow and mitigate the scope of pointer reuse (R1).
• Robustness: Protect configuration and confidentiality of
PAuth keys used by the kernel (R2).
• Deployability: Limit the impact on existing kernel coding
patterns and existing kernel code (R3).
• Performance: Minimize performance overhead in terms of
execution time and memory use in practical use cases (R4).
• Compatibility: Maintain the existing user space application
binary interface (ABI) and PAuth functionality (R5).
3.3. Challenges
The prior kernel support for PAuth targets only EL0 usage.
When we now apply PAuth to protect the Linux kernel, we need
to address security challenges arising from the different software
and hardware context present in EL1:
3.3.1. Key allocation
PAuth supports five simultaneously active keys per processor
core. All kernel tasks share the same address space, and so use the
same set of keys. Kernel PAuth key configuration must be protected
to prevent modification of the keys (R2). However, we must also
maintain the existing Linux ABI on AArch64, which guarantees
that PAuth keys are usable in EL0 (R5). Consequently, keys must
be changed on kernel entry and exit.
3.3.2. Key confidentiality
Kernel keys must remain constant from system boot to system
halt so that signed pointers remain verifiable throughout. Therefore,
when the kernel is not running, the kernel keys must be preserved
in EL1 memory so that the operating system (OS) scheduler
can restore them when switching between ELs. To maintain key
confidentiality, we must both prevent the reading of the PAuth keys
from system registers and memory (R2).
4. Design
4.1. Key management
PAuth keys must be available on boot. Therefore, the boot-
loader uses a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to gen-
erate them and then stores them in XOM [13] before starting the
kernel. XOM is mapped in kernel space but its permissions are
enforced by the hypervisor, and so it allows secure storage of
the keys with minimal performance impact. The key values are
encoded within the executable code of a function that has the sole
purpose of writing the kernel keys into the system configuration
registers. Because the code cannot be read it cannot be disassem-
bled to extract the keys. After completion, the function clears all
GPRs to prevent the keys from being leaked (R2). This ensures
that kernel keys are usable as soon as the kernel boots.
The kernel only needs to set the PAuth register values, it need
not be able to read the keys; hence we can use static code analysis
to verify that no code exists in the kernel, including the loadable
kernel modules (LKMs), which would read the keys from system
registers (R2). We also check that no code exists that would corrupt
the PAuth flags in the SCTLR_EL1 register and thus disable the
kernel keys.
4.2. Backward-edge CFI
The reference implementation [14] of backward-edge CFI with
PAuth is vulnerable to replay attacks within a given thread because
the values of the modifier, SP, often repeat. This problem is
accentuated for the task stacks within the kernel, where system
calls made by a given user thread run with same shallow kernel
stack (of 16 KiB). Moreover, each user thread has its own kernel
stack that is aligned on a 4 KiB boundary, such that the 12
lower order bits of SP repeat across threads. To mitigate such
attacks (R1), we construct the modifier by concatenating the low
order 32 bits of SP with the low order 32 bits of the address of
the function, which is inferred from the current program counter
(PC).
4.3. Pointer Integrity
Protecting all kernel pointers would be prohibitive for per-
formance reasons [15] (R4). Instead, we explicitly mark select
pointers for protection in the kernel source code. To ease software
engineering efforts, we plan to add a new source code attribute to
annotate pointer members in compound type declarations (R3). The
compiler could then automatically insert the signing and authenti-
cating PAuth instructions. Moreover, this would allow the compiler
to use combined PAuth instructions, such as the authenticated
branch-and-link BLRAB, instead of a PACIB and BLR pair. Our
evaluated prototype uses inline assembler macros instead, which
wrap PAuth in C code, for use when assigning or evaluating a
signed pointer.
To ward off reuse attacks, we use a modifier constructed by
concatenating the low-order 48 bits of the containing object’s
address with a 16-bits constant that uniquely identifies a certain
member of a certain object type. Since AArch64 uses only 48 bits
of address space, the modifier uniquely identifies the object in
memory at a given time. The 16-bits constant then segregates
pointers at the same address based on their type. The same modifier
construction is used to protect function and data pointers (R1).
4.4. Forward-edge CFI
Vulnerabilities stemming from writable and corruptible func-
tion pointers within kernel memory are well-known and under-
stood [16]. Consequently, most kernel function pointers are stored
in static operations structures. The operations structures are located
in the read-only section .rodata2 which cannot be tampered
(Section 3.1). This is functionally similar to C++ language virtual
method tables, in the simplified scenario of pure-virtual classes
directly inherited by final concrete derived classes, without multiple
inheritance.
Many kernel object types embed pointers to operations struc-
tures. This approach saves memory if more than one object of a
given type is allocated, and mitigates the risk of corrupted function
pointers. Nevertheless, Cook [17] notes that forward-edge CFI
is still necessary for the kernel. Indeed, there are still writable
function pointers in the Linux kernel that need to be integrity
protected using PAuth, including: 1) pointers in hardware-specific
device drivers that do not follow best practices, and 2) lone function
pointers, which typically are not put in operations structures (since
it would not save memory for a single pointer).
4.5. Data flow integrity (DFI)
Because function pointers are often replaced with operations
tables, an attacker could try to modify the pointers to the tables
instead of the function pointers. Consequently, our design must also
protect pointers to operations tables. For instance, the struct
file structure describes an open file. It contains the f_ops
pointer to const struct file_operations, that contains
a large number of function pointers. Those function pointers are
provided by the file system or device driver backing the given open
file. In this case, f_ops needs to be protected even though it is
a data pointer, not a function pointer, to ensure effective forward-
edge CFI in the kernel. We use the same modifier scheme for both
data and function pointers. We also note that the same approach
for protecting pointers could be used to protect other sensitive
pointers, such as the f_cred pointer to file credentials in the
struct file structure.
In conclusion, our full implementation uses 3 of the 5 keys:
• one instruction key for backward-edge CFI,
• the other instruction key for forward-edge CFI,
• one of the two data keys for DFI.
4.6. Run-time linkage
Most kernel pointers are initialized only at run-time, but a few
are set within static/global structure instances. When such a stati-
cally initialized pointer is integrity-protected with PAuth, its PAC
must be computed before any kernel code attempts to authenticate
and use the pointer (R3). For instance, a struct work_struct
object, describing a deferred execution callback, can be initial-
ized statically in kernel sources using a C pre-processor macro,
DECLARE_WORK, instead of using the INIT_WORK function at
run-time. To address this corner case, a new executable and linkable
format (ELF) section is inserted into the kernel (and LKMs).
This section consists of a table of all statically initialized signed
2. In normal position-independent code (PIC), the .data.relro sec-
tion would be used instead.
Figure 1. Architecture diagram
pointers, not dissimilar to the existing relocation table sections.
Each entry in the table specifies: 1) the location of a to-be-signed
pointer, 2) the PAuth key to use, and 3) the 16-bit constant for the
modifier. Macros such as DECLARE_WORK are altered so that they
automatically define and insert an entry in the table. Then, at early
boot, after Linux kernel self-relocation, the table is iterated through
and each pointer is signed in place. An equivalent procedure is
applied when loading an LKM at run-time.
5. Implementation
Our prototype is based on version 5.2 of the Linux kernel,
running on QEMU[18]. We believe that our findings broadly
apply to other Unix-like kernels on AArch64. We add support
for our architecture to a proprietary firmware bootloader and the
hypervisor. This includes the generation of pseudo-random kernel
keys at boot time, much like the random seed3 for kernel ASLR,
and XOM, which is described next. Our compiler modifications
are based on LLVM 8.0.
5.1. Execute-only memory (XOM)
The bootloader generates the pseudo-random PAuth keys for
the kernel and updates the kernel PAuth key function before the
kernel boots (Figure 1). This conceals the kernel keys without
requiring a costly switch to a higher EL when setting keys at run-
time (R4). Each 128-bits PAuth key is defined by a pair of 64-bits
system registers. The setter runs before interrupts are re-enabled
to prevent key leakage and then loads the keys into GPRs using
the MOVZ and MOVK move-immediate instructions that encode the
values in the instructions themselves. The keys are then assigned
from the GPRs with MSR. All relevant GPRs are zeroed out before
the function returns. The memory page containing the function is
mapped as XOM by the hypervisor, which prevents: 1) reading the
immediate values from the instructions, 2) writing to modify the
code or keys, and 3) execution in EL0. As shown in [12], XOM
security properties are enforced by a proprietary hypervisor, which
also prevents, for instance, tampering with MMU system registers.
5.2. Return address protection
To contain the risk of a replay attack against backward-edge
CFI, we change the PAuth modifier used for signing return ad-
dresses, so that it varies by the called function. The compiler
3. passed to the kernel early boot code via the flattened device tree (FDT)
on AArch64
1 function: // Prologue: sign LR
2 adr ip0, function
3 mov ip1, sp
4 bfi ip0, ip1, #32, #32
5 pacib lr, ip0
6 stp fp, lr, [sp, #16]!
Listing 3. The SP is signed with a custom modifier.
is modified to emit function prologues and epilogues as in list-
ing 3. The move-from-SP instruction (Line 3) is necessary because
AArch64 does not allow SP as an operand of a bit field move
instruction (Line 4). LLVM-generated AArch64 code only saves
and restores SP from memory when a variable size stack allocation
occurs, and as of Linux version 5.0 SP is always restored by adding
an immediate value to it (as on line 6) so it cannot be corrupted.
We also provide functionally equivalent prologue and epilogue
patterns in assembler macros frame_push and frame_pop.
These need to be used in hand-written functions, such as in
optimized single instruction multiple data (SIMD) procedures, but
also in the context-switching function cpu_switch_to. In that
particular function, we additionally need to sign the switched-from
kernel task’s SP and authenticate the switched-to task’s SP using
our pointer integrity scheme, so as to protect the SPs of tasks that
are scheduled out.
5.3. Pointer Integrity
Like outlined in Section 4, most kernel function pointers are
read-only and need no memory protection. However, a number of
them do remain, predominantly within specific device drivers. A
semantic search using Coccinelle [19] over the complete Linux
version 5.2 source code yields 1285 function pointer members
assigned at run-time, residing in 504 different compound types. We
expect that for 229 out of the 504 types—i.e., those with more than
one function pointer—should follow existing kernel practices [16]
and be converted to use read-only operations structures.
Our prototype employs a unified approach to protect point-
ers, i.e., 1) the remaining isolated function pointers, 2) sensitive,
writable data pointers, and 3) data pointers to read-only operations
structures. We use a PAuth modifier with a 16-bits constant iden-
tifying the combination of the containing type and the compound
type member, combined with the 48-bits address of the containing
object. We define in-line PAuth assembler convenience macros to
easily sign and authenticate the pointers. For instance, to access or
assign the operations pointer of an open file:
• One setter, set_file_ops(), signs and stores the pointer
into a struct file object, e.g.:
const struct file_operations my_ops = ...
/* ... */
struct file *fp;
/* ... */
set_file_ops(fp, &my_ops);
• One getter, file_ops() loads, authenticates and returns the
operations pointer from an object (Listing 4), e.g.:
struct file *fp;
/* ... */
file_ops(fp)->read(fp, buf, len, NULL);
Based on these patterns, we have written a Coccinelle [19]
semantic patch that can semi-automatically adjust the kernel source
1 // load signed fp->f_ops from fp (x0)
2 ldr x8, [x0, #40]
3 mov w9, #0xfb45
4 bfi x9, x0, #16, #48 // modifier
5 autdb x8, x9 // authenticate f_ops
6 ldr x8, [x8, #16] // load read
7 blr x8 // call read pointer
Listing 4. A file operations pointer is authenticated before an indirect call.
code whenever a structure member is used in the kernel. Specif-
ically we substitute the direct reading and writing of protected
pointers with explicit get and set inline functions. Then the
get and set functions are manually patched to invoke PAuth
instructions.
5.4. Brute force mitigation
PACs can have up to 31 bits, but with typical Linux page and
virtual address configurations the space remaining for the PACs is
15 bits (see Section A). This lies well within practical reach of a
brute force attack by an attacker-controlled local application. Con-
secutive pointer authentication failures must therefore be limited.
When the authentication of a pointer fails, a memory fault
exception is raised due to an invalid memory address. By default,
a memory fault inside the Linux kernel will unconditionally ter-
minate the user process (SIGKILL signal), and depending on the
context also trigger an OOPS and halt the system. We change the
kernel configuration to halt after a limited number of PAuth failures
have occurred, as they constitute a strong indication of an attempt
at kernel bug exploitation.
5.5. Backward compatibility
Our implementation has a build-time option to issue machine
code for either AArch64 version 8.3 (or higher) only, or for older
versions. To support this, PAuth includes backwards-compatible
PACIB1716 and AUTIB1716 instructions, which behave as no-
ops on older processors. As no such instructions exist for PAuth
data (D) keys, in this case we use the same key for instruction-
and data pointer protection.
6. Evaluation
6.1. Performance evaluation
For functional verification, we use the AArch64 system em-
ulation from the open-source QEMU[18] tool, which supports
ARMv8.3-A and PAuth. However, QEMU is not cycle-accurate and
hence it cannot be used for performance evaluation. As hardware
with ARMv8.3-A is not yet generally available, we replace all
PAuth instructions with the PA-analogue used in prior work on
PAuth [20]. The PA analogue is an instruction sequence that
exhibits the estimated computational overhead of PAuth, i.e., 4-
cycles per instruction. In the same spirit, all writes to PAuth
key system registers (which do not exist on ARMv8.0-A) are
substituted with writes to another register without side effects,
namely CONTEXTIDR_EL1. For performance evaluation, we run
our customized Linux kernel on a RaspBerry Pi 3 ARMv8-A
device. We compare our measurements against a baseline measured
Figure 2. Function call overhead (nanoseconds): 1) Proposed solution:32
bits SP + function address), 2) PARTS: 16 bits SP + 48 bits LLVM LTO
func.id., 3) SP as supported by Clang.
Figure 3. lmbench (relative) latencies with full, backward-edge CFI and no
protection
on the Ubuntu v5.0 kernel running on the same hardware. All error
bars show standard deviation for n = 20.
6.1.1. Key management
We measured an overhead for switching between kernel and
user mode PAuth keys, upon system call or user mode interrupt,
of 9 cycles per key (measurement average: 8.88; variance: .004).
In our micro-benchmarks, we use three different keys: one data key
for DFI and two instruction keys for forward- and backward-edge
CFI, respectively.
6.1.2. Return address protection
Backward-edge CFI adds a fixed overhead per function call,
except for functions optimized to omit their stack frame. Figure 2
compares the run-time cost of 3 different approaches for com-
puting the PAuth modifier. We note that our proposal is slightly
slower than the weaker protection present in compilers, but faster
than prior work with equal security properties for return address
protection [20].
6.1.3. System calls
The performance impact at system call level is measur-
able as double-digit percentual overhead, as measured using the
lmbench [21] kernel micro-benchmarking tool (Figure 3). The
impact is due to a comparatively high rate of function calls to
computation, as is visible in kernel system call implementations.
When measured with user space workloads (Figure 4), the geo-
metric mean of the overhead drops to less than 4%.
6.2. Security Evaluation
For our design to protect kernel control flow (R1) we must
protect the integrity of all necessary pointers and prevent the leak-
age of PAuth keys (R2). As discussed in Section 4, these pointers
are function pointers in writable memory and data pointers to the
operations structures. Based on our threat model (Section 3.1),
read-only memory cannot be corrupted as the memory mappings
are protected by the hypervisor. Other protected pointers are signed
and verified using PAuth.
Figure 4. User-space performance: 1) JPEG picture resize (predominantly
user computation), 2) Debian package build (balanced), 3) Network down-
load (mostly kernel). Presented with full, backwards-edge CFI and no
instrumentation
6.2.1. PAuth reuse attacks
We use PAuth to protect three types of pointers: 1) function
return addresses, 2) writable function pointers, and 3) data pointers
to operations tables. In all cases, PAuth detects the injection of
arbitrary unsigned pointers. The attacker is thus forced to either
guess—with a probability of 2−pac size—or perform a reuse attack.
Return addresses are protected with a hardened modifier scheme
that combines the SP with the function address. The function
address does not completely prevent reuse, but significantly reduces
the scope of attacks. For code and data pointers, the modifier is tied
to the pointer type and its storage location (Section 4). As most
of the PAuth-protected pointers are long-lived and assigned only
once, this effectively prevents most reuse attacks (R1). An attack
is only possible, when a pointer is replaced with another pointer
of the same type. This could happen either because an assigned
pointer is legitimately replaced or because dynamically allocated
structure is assigned the same address as a previously de-allocated
one.
6.2.2. Key confidentiality
When stored in memory, the confidentiality of the PAuth keys
is provided by XOM. During execution, the keys are loaded into
registers from XOM and could thus be leaked if the key-setting
process were preempted. To avoid this, the key-setting function
disables preemption and clears all registers before returning. The
PAuth keys are readable in the configurations registers. However,
because MRS system register read instructions immediately address
the read register, key reads can be trivially found and rejected (e.g.,
when loading a module).
6.2.3. Kernel PAuth verification oracles
Our threat model includes an adversary with arbitrary user
space access. Consequently the attacker could try to find a PAuth
verification oracle. The user space process uses a randomly as-
signed key, and thus cannot verify kernel pointers. Our design
introduces a threshold for allowed PAC authentication failures to
prevent non-critical sections of kernel code from being used as an
oracle. Any failures are also logged, ensuring that such vulnerable
code paths can be fixed.
6.3. Compliance
Our solution does not retain ISO C language [22] semantics,
since we bind the object / function address to the PACs, e.g.,
functions like memcpy() or byte-wise pointer copying / casting
does fail without code adaptation. Also, extra assumptions made
by the Linux kernel, such as: 1) All pointer types have the same
representation or 2) Null pointer values are represented by zero
bits [23], do not hold for PAuth. Our protection does provide,
e.g., strong protection against replay, which would not be possible
if those assumptions were met. We conclude that the benefit of
strong memory protection outweighs the lack of compliance.
6.4. Approach analysis
We select protected pointers for DFI and forward-edge CFI
only in a semi-automated manner. For the Linux kernel, this brings
finer grained coverage and lower run-time overhead, considering
the large amount of read-only pointers, which need no protection.
This solution also provides better replay protection than would
be permitted by pure ISO C language [22] rules. We surmise
that protecting all writable function pointers can be achieved with
reasonable engineering effort within the Linux community.
7. Related work
Most of the work on hardware-assisted memory protection with
ARM PAuth has had user applications as their focus. First out was
the Qualcomm white-paper [14] on simple return-edge CFI with
PAuth, using SP as the only modifier. Apple proposal [24], [25] for
forward-edge protection is similar to ours. However, their approach
to protect vtable’s differs: the vtable pointers are protected with
zero as PAuth modifier. This approach preserves memcpy, but is
susceptible to reuse attacks. Also, Apple signs all pointers in the
vtable. In contrast, we store them in read-only memory to avoid
unnecessary signing of pointers.
The first academic presentation on the subject was PARTS [20],
who presented a more fine-grained solution for both forward- and
backward-edge CFI protection, as well as data pointer protection.
For backward-edge CFI, our hardened solution offers security equal
to PARTS. However, to assign unique function identifiers, PARTS
requires linkage time optimization (LTO), which is intrinsically
incompatible with LKMs and not (yet) widely supported by Linux
build systems. We improve on the modifier construction as dis-
cussed in Section 5.3. Furthermore, we also remedy a PARTS
shortcoming, where the lower 16 bits of SP are prone to replay
attacks across different threads, whose respective stacks may well
be separated by an exact multiple of 216 = 65536 bytes within
the kernel address space.
The PAuth mechanism has also been applied to stack ca-
naries [26], and to a chained (authentication) solution [27] for
fully protecting the stack frames against reuse attacks. None of
these projects considered the kernel as a target for their protection
efforts, and with the exception of the authenticated stack, they are
not readily applicable for kernel protection.
Ferri et al[28] proposed managing (application) keys in hyper-
visor mode (EL2) (or secure firmware mode (EL3)) using dedicated
traps to a higher EL. Kernel keys could potentially also be managed
that way. However the hypervisor traps that this scheme relies on
exist primarily to prevent virtual machines from accessing PAuth
system registers under a legacy PAuth-unaware hypervisor. The
traps can also be used for lazy initialization of PAuth support by
the hypervisor, but they are not intended and optimized for frequent
occurrence.
For memory protection in the Linux kernel, PaX [29] imple-
ments backward- and forward-edge CFI in software respectively
using stack canaries and type-based cookie matching. Moreira et
al. [30] refines software forward-edge kernel CFI by disallow-
ing indirect calls to never indirectly referenced functions. Recent
patches4 by ARM enable return address protection but expose the
kernel PAuth keys in memory.
8. Conclusions and Future work
To date, there has been a lack of academic contributions on how
to apply hardware-assisted memory protection features in proces-
sors to the operating system kernel. In this work, we provide a first
architectural glimpse on how the Linux kernel can accommodate
pointer integrity. Moreover, we show that this can be done at
acceptable performance cost by using hardware assistance such
as PAuth. We also convey the insight that memory and memory
references are treated differently in the kernel, compared to how
they are handled in user space. This hopefully also encourages
more research on OS kernel memory protection; today there are
several memory-protection mechanisms that have appeared or have
been announced for both ARM and Intel platforms, and all of them
could by themselves or in combination be used to strengthen the
OS kernel against run-time attacks.
For this particular work, there are also a few unexplored
directions that we leave for future examination. Attacks targeting
the interrupt handler could potentially modify or replace kernel
register content, e.g. modifiers or previously authenticated pointers.
Register spills pose a similar threat to the integrity of regis-
ter content; indicating that their protection would further reduce
the attack surface. Last, this work does not consider the next
obvious step with authenticated pointers: an integrity-protected
kernel system call ABI where kernel and user space protection
can maintain PAuth security guarantees across across privilege
boundaries. However, we note that the PAuth extension could be
extended to further support the kernel protection setting. At the
instruction set architecture (ISA) level, an extension could support
layered key management such that the hypervisor can manage the
kernel keys without the need for XOM. To allow a hardened ABI
with cross-layer signed pointers, this might also require a processor
flag to select the active–i.e., kernel or user—set of keys.
In conclusion, our work demonstrates how to realize call-
flow protection within the kernel by leveraging the ARMv8.3-A
PAuth extension. Our evaluation indicates that such comprehensive
protection can be achieved with minimal performance overhead
(less than < 4% lmbench). By accounting for practical deploy-
ment limitations, e.g., performance constraints and preservation of
existing ABIs, this work is applicable beyond a research setting.
This work demonstrates that although the kernel imposes such
restrictions, it also offers opportunities for novel kernel-specific
adaptions of existing security mechanisms.
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TABLE 1. VMSAV8 ADDRESS RANGES
Address range Bit 55 Usage
0xffffffffffffffff − 0xffff000000000000 1 Kernel
0xffffefffffffffff − 0x0001000000000000 Invalid
0x0000ffffffffffff − 0x0000000000000000 0 User
TABLE 2. AARCH64 POINTER ON LINUX
User pointer (x = 0)
Tag x Sign extension Page number Page offset
63-56 55 54-48 47-12 11-0
tttttttt 0 000...000 aaa...aaa aaa...aaa
Kernel pointer (x = 1)
Sign ext. x Sign extension Page number Page offset
63-56 55 54-48 47-12 11-0
11111111 1 111...111 aaa...aaa aaa...aaa
Appendix A.
Virtual Memory System Architecture version 8 (VM-
SAv8)
The AArch64 Virtual Memory System Architecture version 8
(VMSAv8) represents virtual memory addresses, or pointers, as
64-bits values. However the virtual address space does not use the
entirety of the 64 bits. The maximum virtual address space size
is 48 bits – or 52 bits with the Large Virtual Address extension,
ARMv8.2-LVA. Additionally, VMSAv8 divides the address space
in two ranges, each with their own translation tables.
For a given virtual memory address, the translation table is
selected by bit 55 (noted x below). By convention, the first
translation table (TTBR0_EL1) maps the address space of the
current user process, while the second table (TTBR1_EL1) maps
kernel addresses. In a typical run-time configuration, such as that of
Ubuntu operating system, the address space has 49 bits: In addition
to bit 55, the lower 49− 1 = 48 bits are used. The remaining bits
are sign-extended (Table 1).
A.1. Address tagging
VMSAv8 optionally ignores the top byte (bits 56-63) of ad-
dresses. Linux enables this feature for user space addresses but
leaves it disabled for kernel-space addresses (except in debug
builds with the kernel address sanitizer (KASAN) enabled). As-
suming the usual page size of 4 KiB, user and kernel addresses
are laid out as shown in Table 2, where t are ignored (tag) bits, and
a are addressing bits. 8 bits and 16 bits are effectively meaningless
sign extension respectively for user and kernel addresses.
A.2. Execute-only memory (XOM) on AArch64
XOM is a type of memory mapping which has only execute
permission, i.e., neither read nor write permission. XOM is already
available with VMSAv8 for user space applications (in EL0).
However the translation table format of VMSAv8 is such that any
memory mapping is implicitly readable at EL1, which precludes
XOM in kernel.
To achieve XOM in EL1, we need to use the second stage
of translation, which comes with AArch64 hardware virtualization
(EL2). In that case, the read permission can be controlled in the
translation table by the hypervisor.
Appendix B.
AArch64 pointer authentication
ARMv8.3-A, the third major revision of ARMv8-A, introduces
the PAuth. This extension adds three new classes of machine
instructions to AArch64:
• PAC. . . instructions sign a pointer: they replace the ”unused”
bits with a MAC before storing the authenticated pointer to
memory.
• AUT. . . instructions authenticate a pointer: they check that
the MAC matches the pointer value after loading a 64-bits
authenticated pointer it from memory.
• XPAC. . . instructions strip the MAC from an authenticated
pointer. This is primarily intended for debugging purposes.
The MAC is based on an implementation-defined (i.e.
processor-dependent) cryptographic hash algorithm with a 128-
bits secret key, 64-bits input and 32-bits output. In reference
implementations, QARMA [11] is used as the hash algorithm,
although this is not mandated by ARM [31].
The sign extension bits are substituted with bits from MAC,
forming the PAC; extraneous MAC bits are discarded. An authenti-
cated pointer would match the following pattern, where c represents
a MAC bit.
B.1. Keys
PAuth supports five distinct keys simultaneously on a given
processor core:
• two keys, IA and IB, to sign instruction pointers, i.e. function
pointers or function call return addresses,
• two keys, DA and DB, to sign data pointers, and
• one key, GA, to sign generic data separately (not constrained
by the address space layout).
Each key is configured at run-time via dedicated privileged
system registers. Since a system register can only hold 64 bits,
two registers are defined for each key, or ten registers in total.
Also each key has its own signing instruction: PACIA, PACIB,
PACDA, PACDB and PACGA. Likewise, each key except for the
generic data key, has its own authenticating instruction: AUTIA,
AUTIB, AUTDA and AUTDB.
B.2. Modifier
The different keys allow for a limited degree of segregation
between different contexts. For instance, out of the two instruction
keys:
• On the one hand, key IA could be used to sign return
addresses, providing backward-edge CFI.
• On the other hand, key IB could be used to sign function
pointers, providing forward-edge CFI.
To protect against trivial replay attacks, whereby two pointers
signed the same key, a cryptographic salt is necessary. That is the
role of the ”modifier” register.
